Static Analysis of The DeepSeek Android App

I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to recognize possible security and privacy concerns.

I've discussed DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, especially given the growing issues around data privacy, sitiosecuador.com surveillance, the potential misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between worldwide powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app yesterday as well. - Bespoke encryption and information obfuscation techniques exist, with signs that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details. - The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of relying on the user gadget's chain of trust. - UI interaction tracking records detailed user behavior without clear approval. - WebView manipulation is present, which could allow for the app to gain access to personal external internet browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here

Device Fingerprinting & Tracking

A significant portion of the analyzed code appears to focus on event device-specific details, setiathome.berkeley.edu which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.

- The app collects different distinct gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details. - System homes, set up plans, and root detection mechanisms suggest potential anti-tampering procedures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security scientists use to root their Android devices. - Geolocation and network profiling exist, indicating possible tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting routines by region. - Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might act in a different way depending on the detected hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract extra device details. E.g. if it can not identify the device through basic Android SIM lookup (since consent was not approved), it attempts producer particular to access the very same details.

Potential Malware-Like Behavior

While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, several observed habits line up with known spyware and malware patterns:

- The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which might assist in unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks. - SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for akropolistravel.com unidentified functions. - The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible monitoring systems. - The app implements calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime. - The.so files themselves reverse and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to load additional.so files. This facility is not usually inspected by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services. - The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete extent of the app's abilities. Moreover, dokuwiki.stream native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate privileges, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.

Remarks

While information collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which must currently offer sufficient authentication. There is no valid reason for the app to aggressively collect and send special gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.

The degree of tracking observed here surpasses normal analytics practices, disgaeawiki.info possibly enabling relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These habits, combined with obfuscation strategies and network communication with third-party tracking services, call for a higher level of examination from security scientists and users alike.

The work of runtime code filling along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app might allow the deployment and execution of unreviewed, from another location delivered code. This is a severe potential attack vector. No proof in this report is provided that from another location released code execution is being done, only that the center for this appears present.

Additionally, the app's method to finding rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, forum.altaycoins.com where security and material defense are critical, thatswhathappened.wiki or in competitive computer game to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such strict measures in an application of this nature, raising more questions about its intent.

Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek should be aware of these potential risks. If this application is being used within an enterprise or government environment, additional vetting and security controls must be enforced before permitting its release on managed gadgets.

Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon fixed code evaluation and does not indicate that all detected functions are actively used. Further examination is needed for conclusive conclusions.